The Commerce Clause and the Balancing Approach: The Delineation of Federal and State Interests: United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road by Kroesche, Guy P.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1981 | Issue 1 Article 19
3-1-1981
The Commerce Clause and the Balancing
Approach: The Delineation of Federal and State
Interests: United Transportation Union v. Long
Island Rail Road
Guy P. Kroesche
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Guy P. Kroesche, The Commerce Clause and the Balancing Approach: The Delineation of Federal and State Interests: United Transportation
Union v. Long Island Rail Road, 1981 BYU L. Rev. 189 (1981).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1981/iss1/19
The Commerce Clause and the Balancing 
Approach: The Delineation of Federal and State 
Interests: United Transportation Union v. Long 
Island Rail Road 
The answer seems to be that the Constitution of the United 
States establishes [that] state governments . . . in certain mat- 
ters are . . . independent of the [federal] government.' 
Prior to National League of Cities v. Usery2 courts had in- 
creasingly invoked the commerce clauses to uphold the federal 
regulation of an expanding variety of activities, including many 
which were not purely interstate. In fact, the Supreme Court 
had begun to uphold federal regulation of entirely intrastate ac- 
tivities,' reasoning that even those activities often have a sub- 
stantial effect on commer~e.~ The increased domain of federal 
1. K. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2 (4th ed. 1964). 
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The decision dealt with the application of the minimum 
wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to state 
and local governmental employees. See 29 U.S.C. $ 203 (1976) (as amended in 1974). In a 
five-to-four decision with Justice Blackmun concurring, the Court determined that Con- 
gress could not invoke the commerce clause to directly displace state management in 
areas of traditional governmental functions nor interfere with the states in their sover- 
eign capacities. Such exercise of congressional authority could not be rationalized with 
the federal system of government as set forth in the Constitution. Usery has been the 
subject of numerous articles and discussions since the decision reversed a trend of an 
expansive reading of the commerce clause that had been developing for nearly forty 
years. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
3. "The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Na- 
tions, and among the several States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, g 8, cl. 3. 
4. For example, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the court upheld 
the restraints of the Fair Labor Standards Act as being within the commerce power and 
consistent with the f i h  and tenth amendments: 
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regula- 
tion of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate 
which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress 
over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a 
legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate inter- 
state commerce. 
Id. at  118. 
5. "Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the 
power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States 
of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that 
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regulation caused apprehension that the reach of national power . 
into state affairs was becoming too broad and that virtually all 
intrastate activity might be regulated under the commerce 
power of the national go~ernment.~ 
The concern that all intrastate commerce would eventually 
be subject to federal regulation was eased by Usery, where the 
Supreme Court manifested a revived sensitivity toward the po- 
tentially detrimental effect of federal regulation on the 
automony of state and local governments. In an earlier case, the 
Court had described federalism as a system which is committed 
"to the legitimate interests of both State and National Govern- 
ments, and in which the National Government, anxious though 
it may be to indicate and protect . . . federal interests, always 
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with 
the legitimate activities of the States. '- Consequently, the 
commerce." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,258 (1964). The 
Supreme Court observed that the regulatory power of Congress to remove obstructions 
of commerce, so far as it applied to public accomodations in eliminating racial discrimi- 
nation, was subject to only one restriction, "that the means chosen by it must be reason- 
ably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." Id. at 261-62. See also Cham- 
pion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (Lottery Case). 
The difliculty remains, however, as to what extent the Constitution will serve to 
protect the sovereignty of the states. The tenth amendment provides, "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. How- 
ever, whether the Court will permit the amendment to actually operate for the benefit of 
the states in areas of federal regulation is questionable. In Darby, for example, the court 
stated, "The [tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not 
been surrendered." 312 U.S. at 124. Contrasting modem views are found in Usery, 426 
U.S. at  842-43, and 426 U.S. at 862-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Consequently, a coher- 
ent and equitable rationale is needed to support reliance on the tenth amendment as a 
restraint upon federal interference with legitimate state interests. See e.g., Fry v. United 
States, 421 U.S. 542, 549-59 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Oregon, 
366 U.S. 643 (1961). 
6. As an extreme example, see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), which 
dealt with loan sharking in a local community. After discussing the commerce clause, the 
Court concluded that loan sharking, "though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of 
Congress affect interstate commerce." Id. at 154. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, felt 
that the Court had overreached by allowing a conviction without any proof or facts 
showing that the conduct affected interstate commerce, stating, "[tlhe definition and 
prosecution of local, intrastate crime are reserved to the States under the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments." Id. at 158. 
7. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971) (emphasis added). In order to determine 
whether the limits of the federal regulatory power have been surpassed, one commenta- 
tor believes it must be shown "that the interference is undue, and that determination in 
turn, requires that the intrusion into the state governmental process and its effect be 
balanced against the need of the federal government to enact the regulation." Mat- 
sumoto, National League of Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State Immunity from 
Commerce Clause Regulrrtion, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 59. See also C. BLACK, PERSPEC- 
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"state sovereignty" doctrine of National League of Cities v. 
Usery confirmed the restraint on federal use of the commerce 
clause to regulate the functions of state government. 
Some believed that the doctrine enunciated in Usery might 
eventually be extended to activities not previously regarded as 
integral or traditional state functions and applied to any activity 
in which the state was actively engaged? However most circuit 
courts have not extended the rationale of Usery in subsequent 
cases involving conflicts between federal and state interests? 
Preference has been given to the federal interest unless there 
has existed a state interest especially deserving of protection 
under the particular circumstances before the court.10 
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road" 
supports the view that the federal government's power to regu- 
late commerce should yield to the legitimate state interest in 
preserving the right to control certain state functions. New York 
State, through the Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
m s  IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1970), which suggests that the assessment of the constitu- 
tionality of an exercise of federal regulatory power should encompass state autonomy 
considerations, a procedure which should not lessen the supremacy of the federal govern- 
ment over state governments. 
8. See, e.g., Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power 
and State Sovereignty Rediviuus, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1115,1133 (1978). "The evil that 
may be done by raising the ghost of state sovereignty may, however, outlive the immedi- 
ate decision of the Court, important though it may be," id. at  1134, and "the revived 
doctrine . . . may apply to all state activities, rather than only those which may be con- 
sidered to involve essential governmental functions." Id. at  1125 (emphasis added). See 
also National League .of Cities v. Uaery, 426 U.S. a t  833,856-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
9. See e.g., New Hampshire v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240,244-47 (1st Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Helsley, 615 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1979); Vehicle Equip. Safety Comm'n v. 
National Highway TrafEc Safety Administration, 611 F.2d 53, 54-55 (4th Cir. 1979); 
Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1979); Pearce v. Wichita County, 
590 F.2d 128, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1979); Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 
938 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Energy Reg- 
ulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Scott, 581 F.2d 589, 592 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 160 n.25 (2nd 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th 
Cir. 1978); New York v. United States, 574 F.2d 128, 131 n.6 (2nd Cir.), aff'd, 439 U.S. 
920 (1978). Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (4th Cir. 1977). 
10. See, e.g., Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979); Dono- 
hoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603, 609, 609 n.17 (4th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 (1978); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 33, 
38 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); Davids v. Alsers, 549 F.2d 120, 127 (9th 
Cir. 1977); Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1977). 
11. 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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(MTA),12 manages the Long Island Rail Road Company 
(LIRR).lS The LIRR is a common carrier that serves five coun- 
ties in the New York City metropolitan area and is the only 
common carrier by rail connecting the public with industry in 
the surrounding counties. The primary function of the LIRR is 
to provide passenger service, though freight operations consti- 
tute a limited share of the business.14 As one of seven collective 
bargaining representatives for the LIRR operating and train em- 
ployees, the United Transportation Union (Union)l5 had pro- 
posed changes in the employment agreement regarding rates of 
pay, rules, and working conditions.le After extensive negotia- 
tions," the Union was on the verge of exhausting the collective 
bargaining procedures provided by the Federal Railway Labor 
Act? On December 7, 1979, the Union filed suit seeking a de- 
claratory judgment that the relationship between the parties was 
governed by the Federal Railway Labor Act1@ and that the em- 
12. The MTA, which still has the day-to-day responsibility for the management of 
the railroad, is a public benefit corporation. Id. at 20-21. 
13. The railroad was acquired by the State of New York in January, 1966. On Feb- 
ruary 8, 1980, the railroad was converted from a private stock corporation to a public 
benefit corporation. Id. 
14. The total income of the LIRR approximates $300 million. The revenue from 
freight operations in 1979 was in excess of $12.1 million, but that figure is miniscule in 
comparison to the overall income of the railroad. Id. at 20-21. The income from the 
freight revenues exceeded $18 million in 1978. United Transp. Union v. Long Island 
R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300, 1304 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
15. United Transportation Union is the sole representative directly involved in this 
suit, although the other representatives filed amicus curiae briefs. See United Transp. 
Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300, 1301 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
16. Brief for Appellee at 1. 
17. The negotiations continued over an eighteen-month period. Long Island R.R. 
Co. v. United Transp. Union, 484 F. Supp. 1290, 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
18. 45 U.S.C. $8 151-188 (1976). 
19. The Railway Labor Ad  does not explicitly allow for the parties to resort to self- 
help (strike). However, federal case law has indicated that employees subject to the Act 
may resort to self-help once the grievance procedures provided for in the collective bar- 
gaining agreement have been exhausted. But see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jack- 
sonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969). 
The Act provides: 
The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid riny interruption to commerce or 
to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation 
upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of 
employment or otherwise, of the right of the employees to join a labor organi- 
zation; (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employ- 
ees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this chapter; 
(4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning 
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and 
orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the inter- 
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ployees, should they engage in self-help, were not subject to the 
sanctions of New York's Taylor Law,"O which prohibits strikes 
by public  employee^.^^ The Union also sought injunctive relief to 
protect the rights of the employees guaranteed under the federal 
act, including an injunction against the commencement of a 
state court action invoking the Taylor Law. On December 8, 
1979, the Union, along with the other six unions, went on strike. 
A Presidential Emergency Board was established on December 
14, 1979,'2 and the union employees returned to work? On Feb- 
ruary 8, 1980, two months after the district court action was 
filed, MTA converted the LIRR from a private stock corporation 
to a public benefit corporation, whose employees would techni- 
cally be subject to the state's Taylor Law." 
Following further litigation,a6 the Union moved for sum- 
mary judgment. The United States District Court for the East- 
ern District of New York granted the motion for summary judg- 
ment, finding that the LIRR was a "carrier" engaged in 
interstate transportation and consequently subject to the Rail- 
way Labor Act." The district court rejected the invitation to 
find that the federal regulation improperly displaces the free- 
dom of the state to structure its integral operations in those ar- 
pretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working 
conditions. 
45 U.S.C. 8 1512 (1976). 
20. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW $8 200-214 (McKinney 1978). 
21. "No public employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike, and no 
public employee or employee organization shall cause, instigate, encourage, or condone a 
strike." N.Y. CIV. SEW. LAWS 8 210(1) (McKinney 1978). 
22. 634 F.2d at 21. The statutory authorization for this function can be found in 
Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 8 160 (1976). 
23. 634 F.2d at 21. The President's action authorized a "cooling off' period of sixty 
days. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (E.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
24. 634 F.2d at 21. Prior to that date, the MTA and LIRR had moved to dismiss the 
action. That motion was not heard before the LIRR was converted to a public benefit 
corporation. Id. 
25. On February 12, the Union moved for a temporary restraining order and prelim- 
inary injunctive relief to prevent a state court action under the Taylor Law to enjoin a 
strike by Union members. On February 13, the LIRR commenced suit in the Supreme 
Court, New York County, seeking an injunction under the Taylor Law against the im- 
pending strike by the Union. On February 14, after a temporary restraining order was 
issued, that action was removed to the United State District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. On February 25, that action was then transferred and consolidatd 
with the district court case. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 
1300, 1301-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
26. Id. at 1305. 
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eas which are traditionally termed "governmental functions," 
concluding that the federal scheme preempts the state from reg- 
ulating the labor relations of the railroad's  employee^."^ In the 
view of the district court, employees of the LIRR who have ex- 
hausted the bargaining and mediation procedures of the Railway 
Labor Act have a federally guaranteed right to strike, and that 
right may not be prohibited through the enforcement of the 
Taylor Law? The district court then issued an injunction re- 
straining the LIRR and the MTA from taking any action in 
state court based on an alleged violation of the Taylor Law. The 
Union, however, was enjoined from striking"@ pending review by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
The Second Circuit reversedoso In drawing the line which 
separates state and federal regulation, Judge Sweet," writing for 
the ~our t ,8~ first noted that the district court had correctly de- 
termined that the LIRR was a "carrier" within the meaning of 
the Railway Labor Actass Even though the Act did not specifi- 
cally include local transportation systems within its coverage, 
the Second Circuit declined to exclude the public commuter rail- 
road from coverage under the Act, in spite of arguments that 
Congress would have done so had it foreseen how the railroad 
would evolveoM However, the court recognized that the LIRR 
may be subject to the literal terms of the Act, and even though 
Usery arguably excludes railroads from the definition of what 
constitutes an integral part of state governmental a~tivity,'~ the 
27. Id. at 1306. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 1309. The labor dispute which gave rise to the court action was ultimately 
settled on April 11, 1980. 634 F.2d at 21 n.6. 
30. 634 F.2d at 20. 
31. United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by 
designation. Id. at 20 n**. 
32. Joining in the opinion were Circuit Judge Mulligan and Judge Spears, United 
States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation. Id. at 20 
n*. 
33. Id. at 22. 
34. Id. at 23. The court did not seem bothered by the conversion of the LIRR to a 
public benefit corporation which made the railroad facially subject to the Taylor Law. 
The conversion appears to have been made solely for the purpose of avoiding the regula- 
tion of the Railway Labor Act and to prohibit the Union employees from striking after 
the collective bargaining process had been exhausted. 
35. Id. at 23-26. Usery did not "extend the protective mantle of sovereignty to 'ar- 
eas that the States have not regarded as integral parts of their governmental activities,' 
such as operating a railroad." Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permuta- 
tions of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Y m  L.J. 1165, 1172 
(1977) (citing 426 U.S. at 854 n.18). 
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Railway Labor Act arguably does not apply to a publicly-owned 
local commuter transportation system such as the LIRR merely 
because it engages in a minimal, yet significant, amount of inter- 
state freight business." The court reasoned that enforcement of 
the Act may impair the state's ability to shape employer-em- 
ployee relationships in its role as the sole provider of an essen- 
tial public servicew and applied the analysis promulgated in 
Usery: 
The inquiry is therefore essentially two-tiered. . . . [W]e 
must first consider whether the operation of the railroad quali- 
fies as an integral or traditional government function. If it 
does, the federal interest in regulating the collective bargaining 
relations of LIRR employees under the Railway Labor Act 
must be weighed against the State's interest in applying the 
Taylor Law? 
In the first step of the analysis, the Second Circuit reasoned 
that "essentiality is gauged not only in terms of the nature of a 
public service, but also its availability in the marketpla~e."~~ 
The court recognized that the LIRR was predominantly a public 
commuter-passenger service and that the railroad as public mass 
transit was becoming an alternative mode of transportation in 
several major metropolitan areas.40 The court also noted the po- 
tential economic effect on the community if the service were dis- 
continued. Furthermore, the opinion stated that well over eighty 
percent of the company revenue is generated by the purely in- 
trastate passenger service, and only four percent ($12 million of 
36. 634 F.2d at 22-23. 
37. Id. at 23-24. 
38. Id. at 24. 
39. Id. at 29. The availability of the service in the marketplace is certainly an im- 
portant consideration. That is precisely one of the distinctions between the case consid- 
ered here and Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). The See- 
ond Circuit in United Transportation Union considered the impkt of Lafayette on 
Usery, concluding that the case should be limited to its antitrust context. Though the 
enterprise involved there, a municipally owned electric utility, was on par with the im- 
portance of the commuter railroad as a public service, that service was not provided 
solely by the state. Rather, the City of Lafayette competed with private enterprise for 
customers. The existence of an alternative source for that service demonstrates that en- 
forcement of the state regulation was not essential for the benefit of the public and that 
it was economically feasible for private enterprise to provide the needed service. 634 F.2d 
at 27-28. 
40. 634 F.2d at 26-27. Miami will open a public mass transit system in 1982. Transit 
systems already exist in New York, Atlanta, Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco. Id. at  
26 n.20. 
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$300 million in total revenue) by the interstate freight service." 
Therefore, since the railroad was provided solely by the state, 
the court reasoned that the LIRR could be characterized as an 
essential governmental function? The decision was in line with 
reasoning that "[tlhe ownership or operation of a railroad . . . 
may be deemed, in certain regions, as essential as the operations 
of bridges, street lights, or a sewage system."4s The court ex- 
plained that "[o] bviously, the catalog of essential state-provided 
services is not and cannot be static."44 
The court then weighed the competing federal and state in- 
terests. The purposes of both the Railway Labor Act and the 
Taylor Law are to avoid the interruption of commerce, to pro- 
vide an orderly method of dispute resolution, and to insure con- 
tinuous service.4s The court acknowledged that the right to 
strike free from state interference has been held essential to the 
federal scheme of reg~la t ion .~~ Nevertheless, since the service 
was state-provided and generated primarily intrastate revenues, 
the federal interest in allowing the employees to engage in self- 
help was not "demonstrably greater"47 than the state's interest 
41. Id. at  20-21. The remaining 16% is apparently generated by various miscellane- 
ous sources. I t  is not accounted for in the instant case. 
42. Id. at  25-27. 
43. Comment, National League of Cities and the Parker Doctrine: The Status of 
State Sovereignty under the Commerce Clause, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301,311 (1980). In 
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), Justice Douglas stated: 
A State may deem it as essential to its economy that it own and operate a 
railroad, a mill, or an irrigation system as it does to own and operate bridges, 
street lights, or a sewage disposal plant. What might have been viewed in an 
earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous extension of state activities 
may today be deemed indispensible. 
Id. at 591 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1125; Amersbach 
v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (6th Cir. 1979). 
44. 634 F.2d at 26. 
45. Id. at  29. Compare 45 U.S.C. 151a (1976) with N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 211 
(McKinney 1978). 
46. "The Railway Labor Act's entire scheme for the resolution of major disputes 
would become meaningless if the States could prohibit the parties from engaging in any 
self-help." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 
381 (1969) (emphasis in original). Any effort by the state to inhibit the self-help provi- 
sions of the Railway Labor Act would frustrate the effective implementation of the Act. 
Justice Douglas, dissenting, disagreed with the majority's characterization of the issue as 
being whether "the States could prohibit the parties from engaging in any self-help." Id. 
at  397 (emphasis in original). Rather he argued that the scheme of the Act is to provide 
for the settlement of labor disputes under a variety of measures, not to grant the em- 
ployees an unrestricted "right" to strike. 
47. This was the phrase used by Justice Blackmun in Usery. 426 U.S. at 856 (Black- 
mun, J., concurring). 
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in preserving the unimpeded flow of commuter transportation. 
The court determined that the inability to prohibit strikes by 
public employees and the economic effect thereof would deprive 
the state of the right to make "fundamental employment deci- 
sions" essential to its "separate and independent existen~e."~~ 
The Second Circuit then proceeded to extend the state sover- 
eignty doctrine of Usery to exempt the public commuter rail- 
road with interstate connections from federal regulation, even 
though the operation of a railroad had not previously been re- 
garded as an integral or traditional state function.4@ The court 
emphasized that they were guided by the ground-breaking hold- 
ing of Usery: 
States as States stand on a quite different footing from an indi- 
vidual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of Con- 
gress' power to regulate commerce. . . . Congress may not ex- 
ercise that power so as to force directly upon the States its 
choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of 
integral governmental functions are to be madeP0 
The approach taken by the court in United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island Rail RoadB1 was well reasoned and effec- 
48. 426 U.S. at 851. See 634 F.2d at 30. 
49. 634 F.2d at 26, 30. See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), where 
even though the railroad was owned by the State of California, the United States Su- 
preme Court found the railroad subject to the provisions of the Federal Safety Act. In 
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), which involved a common carrier owned and 
operated by the State of California, the state civil service laws were in conflict with the 
provisions of the Railway Labor Act. The court reasoned that "by engaging in interstate 
commerce by rail, [the state] subjects itself to the commerce power so that Congress can 
. . . regulate its employment relationships." Id. at 568. Also, Usery states that the "ac- 
tivity to which the congressional command was directed was not in an area that the 
States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental activities. I t  was, on the 
contrary, the operation of a railroad . . . ." 426 U.S. at  854 11.18. The Second Circuit in 
United Transportation Union did not feel that the decision in United States v. Califor- 
nia concluded the issue. Rather the court felt that the definition of state sovereignty in 
Usery suggested that "traditional" and "integral" must be defined to meet changing 
times. 634 F.2d at 26. See Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 
1979). The railroad in United States v. California, even though state owned and oper- 
ated intrastate like the LIRR, was a freight service, which clearly distinguishes it from 
the LIRR, which provides an invaluable public function of passenger transportation in a 
metropolitan area. 
50. 634 F.2d at 30 (quoting 426 U.S. at 854-55). 
51. The Second Circuit has adhered to the principle of weighing the competing 
interests. 
In determining whether an otherwise valid exercise of the federal commerce 
power would impermissibly impair state sovereignty we [are] therefore re- 
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tive, but the decision fails to provide adequate guidelines for fu- 
ture federal and state regulatory conflictsm and to alleviate con- 
cerns that federal regulatory powers are being deprived of their 
effectiveness. A better approach would present fairly objective 
standards for the courts to apply in determining whether certain 
services which are being gathered into the expanding arena of 
state endeavorM are protected from federal intervention. Illusive 
concepts such as "integral," "traditional," and "essential" have 
been used in United Transportation Union and Usery, as well 
as other cases, without formulating an easily applicable proce- 
dure for determining which state activities fall under the mean- 
ing of those terms. The use of flexible, yet clearly defined stan- 
dards would adequately delineate the federal and state interests 
and provide stability and direction for this area of the law. 
Previously suggested guidelines for determining the sphere 
of protected state functions have not been suf'Ecient for many 
circumstances. Such guidelines are too dependent upon political 
concerns and are either tailored too narrowly, fitting only the 
quired to balance the reason for the exercise against the extent of usurpation 
of state policy-making or invasion of integral state functions that would result, 
giving "appropriate recognition to the legitimate concerns of each 
government." 
634 F.2d at 29 (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (emphasis added)). Although Friends of the Earth dealt 
with a municipal entity challenging enforcement of an EPA-promulgated anti-pollution 
regulation, the court, in line with Usery, stated that "Congress is prohibited by the 
Tenth Amendment from using its power under the Commerce Clause to impair 'attrib- 
utes of sovereignty attaching to every state government' and that these attributes extend 
to a state's political subdivisions, including local governmental units." 552 F.2d at  33. 
52. 634 F.2d at 30. As technology develops and society expands, the standards must 
remain somewhat flexible and yet well-defined to deal with the variations. Just as the car 
eventually replaced the horse and buggy, it is reasonably foreseeable that with our rap- 
idly increasing population and improved technology the automobile will be replaced by 
other, perhaps more convenient and safe modes of transportation, including mass transit. 
"Moreover, we cannot be blind to the sweep of the world wide events which by all indica- 
tions is forcing substantial alteration of our former profligate transportation practices 
and undeniably will create reliance on public mass transit." Id. at  27. In turn, it should 
be recognized that state and federal regulation of the new developments is sure to follow. 
53. Since several states now provide public mass transit, usually due to public de- 
mand and necessity, it is not unreasonable to assume that the state is likely to become 
involved in other areas which are or were solely within the domain of private enterprise. 
Further, even though mass transit had not been available to the public sector until re- 
cently, the Second Circuit in United Transportation Union determined that: 
Although this is a relatively new development, there is now no reasoned basis 
for finding that the operation of an intrastate passenger service which trans- 
ports tens of thousands to and from their jobs every day is any less a govern- 
mental function than are sanitation or public parks and recreation. 
Id. at 27. See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851. 
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cases from which they were formulated, or tailored too broadly, 
failing to provide an ascertainable standard to limit their appli- 
cation. One of those suggested guidelines has been the "essen- 
tiality" of the s e r ~ i c e . ~  One commentator who expressed reser- 
vation when Usery refused to extend state regulatory control to 
the operation of a publicly owned railroads5 suggested several 
factors to consider in defining an essential state function. Such 
factors include whether the state could furnish the service more 
effectively than a private entity, the availability of that service 
to the public at large, and the support for the service within the 
l o ~ a l i t y . ~  The author believed the factors to be relatively simple 
to measure and apply. The factors, however, depend, to a vary- 
ing degree, on the political tenor of the community, a tenor that 
is unlikely to remain constant. A clearer set of elements for de- 
termining whether a protected governmental function exists can 
be found in Arnersbach v. City of C l e ~ e l a n d , ~ ~  where the empha- 
sis seemed to be upon certain economic considerations and com- 
munity need. In that case, however, the elements were keyed to 
the "public service" rationale, which is potentially unlimited in 
its application since nearly every activity that affects the public 
interest may constitute a state function exempt from federal in- 
tervention. The determination of whether the service provided 
by the state is exempt from federal regulation should involve 
54. Judge Sweet, in United Transportation Union, focused on the essential nature 
of the service provided by the state in terms of the public need and the availability of 
the service in the marketplace. 634 F.2d at  29. 
55. Michelman, supra note 35, at  1172. 
56. "Essentiality" would reside in just this fact of actual political acceptance of 
some view as (i) the service is a "public good" in the microeconomic sense, 
collective provision of which tends towards better satisfaction of private pref- 
erences than the private market could achieve; or (ii) the service is something 
that must be made freely available to everyone as a condition of some other 
social-justice conception that the electorate has accepted; or (iii) it is in the 
commdity's interest that the rules of legitimate po&al struggle should be 
honored, and the service is one for which there is prevailing local support 
under those rules. 
Id. at 1177 (footnotes ommitted). 
57. 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979). Other factors the court in Amersbach postulated 
were: 
(1) the government service or activity benefits the community as a whole and is 
available to the public at little or no direct expense; (2) the service or activity 
is undertaken for the purpose of public service rather than for pecuniary gain; 
(3) government is the principal provider of the service or activity; and (4) gov- 
ernment is particularly suited to provide the service or perform the activity 
because of a community wide need for the service or activity. 
Id. at 1037. 
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factors relevant to the immediate controversy. Such an approach 
would allow the expansion of state interests to be dealt with in a 
predictable manner," with attention given to the pertinent cir- 
cumstances of each case."@ 
Guidelines that define those state activities that should be 
exempt from federal regulation need to be designed to fairly jus- 
tify state autonomy from the federal interest. Therefore, the dis- 
puted activity or service should not be exempt from federal reg- 
ulation unless (1) the service is provided by the state; (2) the 
service, if revenue generating, derives its revenues primarily 
from intrastate commerce; (3) no alternative service is available 
in the private sector; (4) the service is necessary to the public 
and no alternative service can be provided by the state without 
substantial adjustment in the community; and (5) the federal in- 
terest, with particular emphasis on public policy considerations, 
does not otherwise outweigh the state interest. 
First, the disputed service must be provided by the state in 
order to justify displacement of the federal regulation. The re- 
quirement of state involvement insures a direct state interest in 
the service. Unless the service is state provided, there would be 
no justification for a claim that the federal regulation infringes 
upon any "state" function." It is not sdc ien t  that the state be 
58. The approach, by necessity, should not be haphazard since 
[A] stoppage in utility service so clearly involves the needs of a community as 
to invoke instinctively the power of government. This Court should not ignore 
history and economic facts in construing federal legislation that comes within 
the area of interacting State and federal control. To derive from the general 
language of the federal act a "right" to strike in violation of a State law regu- 
lating public utilities is to strip from words the limits inherent in their context. 
Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employ- 
ment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 405 (1951) (Frankfurter J., dissenting) (emphasis ad- 
ded). The case dealt with the constitutionality of Wisconsin's labor legislation known as 
the Public Utility Anti-Strike Law. 
59. "The adjustment thus called for between State and National interests is not 
attained by reliance on uncritical generalities or rhetorical phrases unnourished by the 
particularities of specific situations." Id. at 403. 
60. In Usery, the Supreme Court found that Congress may not exercise its power 
over interstate commerce to regulate state functions in the same manner it is allowed to 
control private enterprise. 
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating 
individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the govern- 
ment of the Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to 
uphold a similar exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private 
citizens, but to the States as States. 
426 U.S. at 845. The fact that a state function is involved, however, does not end the 
analysis. That function must comply with additional requirements to escape federal 
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merely associated with the disputed function; limits must be 
placed upon the reach of alleged state interests. To allow the 
"state interest" to reach those activities not furnished by the 
state merely because they affect certain state functions would, 
like the "public service" analysis, be potentially limitless in ap- 
plication." However, if the service is furnished by the state and 
would not have been available to the community unless it was 
state supported, i.e., it is not economically feasible or the private 
sector is unwilling to undertake the business, then the argument 
for enforcing the state statute is heightened. In United Trans- 
portation Union, the LIRR was a state owned and operated 
public commuter railroad. Therefore, the first requirement 
would have been satisfied. 
Second, where the state-provided service is revenue generat- 
ing, such revenues must be derived primarily from intrastate 
commerce to exempt the function from federal regulation. In 
United Transportation Union, well over eighty percent of the 
revenues derived from the LIRR were generated by intrastate 
activities. Therefore, this factor weighed in favor of prohibiting 
federal regulation of the state service. The entity having the 
preemption. 
61. Due to apprehension that Usery will lead to a greater expansion of essential 
state functions, the court in United Transportation Union and most commentators have 
shied away from allowing an activity considered a "public service" to escape federal reg- 
ulation for that reason alone. "Thus, it is in the area of federal regulatory power in which 
an extension of the . . . [Usery] decision has the greatest potential for future applica- 
tion." Matsumoto, supra note 7, at  80. An "essential public service" test was rejected in 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974), which determined that 
since the "supplying of a utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of 
the State," there was not the requisite state action, even though the privately owned and 
operated utility was subject to extensive state regulation. Only those activities which are 
or may become a state function, subject to the clarifications mentioned above, should be 
protected from federal intervention. This does not include those enterprises in which the 
state is only provisionally involved. 
It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses "affected" with 
a public interest . . . . The phrase "affected with a public interest" can, in the 
nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is 
subject to control for the public good. In several of the decisions of this court 
wherein the expressions "affected with a public interest," and "clothed with a 
public use," have been brought forward as the criteria . . . it has been admit- 
ted that they are not susceptible of definition and form an unsatisfactory test 
. . . .  
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934). This in itself indicates the numerous 
functions the "public service" test could encompass. The court in United Transporta- 
tion Union did, in fact, discuss the "public service" analysis when considering the "es- 
sentiality" of the state function-its need by the public and availability in the market- 
place. See 634 F.2d at 29. 
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dominant economic interest in the activity will certainly have 
adequate justification for the furtherance and protection of its 
interests. 
Third, the state service should not be exempt from federal 
regulation where a comparable service is available within the 
private sector. If a similar service is furnished by private enter- 
prise and is readily available to the public sector, then the state 
function is unlikely to be characterized as essential. The state 
should not be allowed undue advantages when in direct competi- 
tion with private enterprise. If a state were allowed to restrict 
the activities of public employees, and similarly situated private 
businesses could not regulate the activities of their employees in 
the same manner, the resulting benefit to the state and dispa- 
rate treatment of public and private employees is obvious. In 
United Transportation Union, the LIRR was the only service of 
its kind available. The service was provided solely by the state. 
Additionally, the LIRR was converted to a public corporation, 
indicating that it was no longer practical for the private sector 
(or they were unwilling) to provide a similar service. 
Fourth, if the public service were discontinued, the adjust- 
ments necessary for the state to furnish an alternative service 
must be impractical or costly, and the economic and social im- 
pact on the community extensive. This factor requires an exami- 
nation of the physical and economic, as well as the less tangible, 
effects upon the public and private entities involved with or con- 
nected to the service. If the physical modifications necessary to 
provide a substitute for the public service are impractical and 
costly, then continuation of the public service, regulated by the 
state, may be the most viable choice.62 The economic considera- 
tions and societal involvement with the public service and its 
operation often directly influence or determine the public sup- 
port for and use of the facility. Consideration, then, should be 
given to whether the economic loss to the state and community 
would be substantial should the federal regulation be enforced." 
62. William J. Ronan, then Chairman of the New York State Metropolitan Com- 
muter Transit Authority, indicated that without the LIRR, ten blocks in the center of 
New York City would be necessary just for parking and that it would necessitate twenty- 
six lanes of expressway, each way, to handle t r a c .  See Effect of Railroad Mergers on 
Commuter Transportation: Hearings before the Subcommission on Housing and Urban 
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Seas. 1138 
(1970). 
63. Due to an eleven day transit strike in April of 1980, New York City lost an 
estimated $1.1 billion, and private business lost $100 million per day. Cirrillo, New 
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Where the economic prosperity of %?the private and public seg- 
ments of the state are materially enhanced through state regula- 
tion, or would suffer substantial setbacks through assertion of 
the federal interest, then the state interest should prevail. hlore- 
over, special consideration should be given to those benefits not 
easily measured in economic terms that are derived from the re- 
spective interests. Those benefits might include the convenience 
that the presence of the service furnishes to the public sector, 
the ease of administration over the service as opposed to possi- 
ble alternatives, and other beneficial aspects, if any, gained from 
the service. If the use by the public is not substantial, then the 
effect on the community if the service were discontinued, at  
least temporarily, would probably not be prohibitive. In that cir- 
cumstance, the public service should potentially be subject to 
federal regulation. Indeed, the amount of use is an excellent in- 
dication of the community support for the service in weighing 
the need for state, as opposed to federal, regulation thereof. As 
indicated previously, in United Transportation Union the im- 
pact on the metropolitan area would have been material had the 
LIRR ceased operation even temporarily. 
Fifth, if the state interest best serves the public welfare, in 
recognition of the requirements of public policy, then the federal 
regulation should give deference to the state interest. In United 
Transportation Union, the purposes behind the federal and 
state regulations were similar; so this factor was not determina- 
tive. However, in other cases involving federal and state legisla- 
tion, the purposes of the respective regulations may differ sub- 
stantially. In those instances, examination of the legislative 
background is important because legislation usually represents 
an effort to implement public policy." Public policy requires 
that the basic needs of the populace be provided for and that 
the "essential" services which connect the metropolitan area 
continue uninterrupted. This is true even though that policy is 
in derogation of the interests of a certain group, such as the rail- 
road employees in the instant case. Further, the mere existence 
Yorkers Ride Again, ASSOCIATED PRESS, April 12, 1980. Also, the impact of the transit 
strike on New York City in 1966 caused substantial business losses, traffic congestion, 
and disruption of the public sector. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1966, 5 1, at 1, col. 1. 
64. "Because integral operations represent policy choices about 'the manner in 
which [states] deliver . . . governmental services which their citizens require,' . . . [Con- 
gressional legislation] which necessarily affects policy choices, is integral to the operation 
of state and local governments." Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analyses in the 
Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1301, 1338 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
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of a federal regulation should not conclude the issue; rather the 
state interest must be considered as part of the analysis." The 
regulation should be related to a legitimate state intere~t:~ and 
the means chosen to effectuate that interest should be 
considered."' 
Finally, the result sought through implementation of the 
federal regulatory scheme should be taken into consideration. 
When enforcement of the state regulation will necessarily cir- 
cumvent some federal act, a determination should be made as to 
whether that displacement is warranted or whether there has 
been an undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme? 
This fifth factor should serve to gather the determinations made 
under the previous factors and ensure that each of the pertinent 
elements is fairly considered. Therefore, if the federal govern- 
ment's interest in preserving the rights of those involved with 
the public service can be served through alternative means, such 
as the collective bargaining procedures available in United 
Transportation Union, then the federal scheme of regulation 
would not be improperly displaced by the enforcement of the 
state statute. 
In a government such as ours, the size and reach of the fed- 
eral interest should not obscure the limited, though consequent- 
ial, state interest? In determining whether state activities are 
exempt from federal regulation, the courts should weigh the ad- 
vantages of allowing diverse responses to local needs against the 
65. "[A] State is not merely a factor in the 'shifting economic arrangements' of the 
private sector of the economy, . . . but is itself a coordinate element in the system estab- 
lished by the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. at 849 (citations omitted). 
66. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186 (1950); 
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945). 
67. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 341 (1978). 
68. "States are not immune from all federal regulation under the Commerce Clause 
merely because of their sovereign status." Fry v. United States, 421 US. 542, 548 (1975) 
(quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1968)) (emphasis added). 
69. "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are 
sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an 
unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly 
to be attributed to Congress." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,351 (1943). The decision in 
Parker was firmly grounded on principles of federalism. See also Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 398, 438 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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federal interest in the unimpeded flow of interstate commerce.70 
It is necessary that the courts closely guard state sovereignty; 
"federal regulation[s] . . . should not be instruments for keeping 
individual states from moving ahead to meet social needs by lo- 
cal action."71 However, while attention is given to the fulfillment 
of individual needs through state regulation, those needs must 
be fulfilled carefully in order not to inhibit Congress in its at- 
tempt to solve national problems.?' The use of flexible yet 
clearly defined standards should simplify the analysis and en- 
able the courts to accomplish that result. 
The standards outlined above should aid courts as they at- 
tempt to determine the validity of competing state and federal 
interests and solve issues similar to those presented in United 
Transportation Union. The first four factors should define those 
activities that may be properly exempt from federal interven- 
tion. The final factor serves to balance the federal and state in- 
terests and ensure that fair consideration is given to the particu- 
lar facts of the case before a decision is rendered. Therefore, 
even though a material segment of a public service may affect 
interstate commerce, if that portion does not constitute a pre- 
dominant part of the overall enterprise, and the state interest in 
preserving the intrastate function outweighs the federal interest 
in regulating interstate commerce, the federal regulation should 
not be permitted to interfere with the state service. 
Federal intervention that increases state costs, reduces state 
programs, causes displacement of state policies, and impairs the 
state's ability to structure employer-employee relationships, 
70. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318-321 (1851). 
71. Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State, Constitutional Rights 
in the Public Sector, 39 WASH. L. REV. 4, 28 (1964). 
72. See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Af- 
firmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 Hmv. L. REV. 1065, 1092 (1977). 
The article also discusses factors which might be considered to allow a federal regulation 
to prevail over state interests. "A number of justifications may be available to overcome 
such state challenges . . . . [Where] the federal regulation clearly does not jeopardize 
state provision of essential services . . . [or where] the federal government is bearing any 
increased cost or providing an adequate substitute for the state service it is regulating," 
the federal interest might be determinative. Id. at 1096-97. This factor seems closely 
akin to the availability of the state provided service in the marketplace. If an alternative 
source for the service exists, then there is no reason to restrict the federal regulation of 
the state controlled public function. However, the fact that the federal government 
furnishes financial support should not be determinative, as such assistance exists in 
other areas of integral state government functions. See National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. at 878 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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might be impermissible interferences of state functions," de- 
pending on the situation. Federal intervention in those cases 
should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule." How- 
ever, where the circumstances before the court favor the imple- 
mentation of the federal regulation or some particular federal 
interest requires protection," the state interest should conform 
to federal legislation. Therefore, if enforcement of the federal 
regulation would not jeopardize the state provision of "essential" 
services, then there would be sufEcient grounds for upholding 
the federal interest. 
The constant balancing of the competing state and federal 
interests enables the law to remain an important force in the 
development and structuring of society.76 In addition, that bal- 
ancing provides the courts with enough flexibility to react to his- 
torical, empirical, and social developments. Use of the suggested 
guidelines should complement the existing procedure by di- 
73. See Horowitz, The Autonomy of The University of California Under The State 
Constitution, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 23, 33 (1978). 
74. See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 
544-45 (1954). In addition, the tenth amendment, by its terms, does not prohibit certain 
congressional action. Rather, it is simply an example 
of the understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that 
the States were sovereign in many respects, and that although their legislative 
authority could be superseded by Congress in many areas where Congress was 
competent to act, Congress was nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it 
were just another individual or business enterprise subject to regulation. 
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 557 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion in Usery. 
75. State Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ga. 1976). The 
federally guaranteed right of certain employees to strike in United Transportation 
Union, however, does not override the state interest in preserving the smooth operation 
of its mass transit system. 
76. For additional insight into the support and handling of the balancing approach, 
see Shapiro, Mr. Jwtice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HAW. L. REV. 293 (1976), 
and Tushnet, supra note 64, at 1301. Mr. Tushnet perceived the effect of Usery as reas- 
serting a judicial role in protecting state and local interests against congressional 
intrusion. 
States provide a haven for individual activity safe from overreaching by the 
national government. Local citizens are able to control state government more 
easily than national citizens can control a national government. Further, even 
if a local minority is oppressed, the opportunity for migration without breaking 
all ties to one's homeland exists where the oppressor is a local government: 
[but] it does not where the oppressor is the national government. 
Id. at  1346. 
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recting the courts' attention to the relevant factors in each case 
and enabling the judiciary to reach fairly considered solutions. 
Guy P. Kroesche 
